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Understanding the Pari Passu Clause in
Sovereign Debt Instruments: A Complex
Quest
DR. RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL*
"Judges rule on the basis of law, not public opinion, and they should be totally indif-
ferent to pressures of the times."
Warren E. Burger (1907-1995), Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
Abstract
The pari passu clause mistakenly migrated from secured private lending to unsecured sovereign
lending. Once rooted in unsecured sovereign lending instruments, it faced the provisions of certain
jurisdictions that allow a creditor to create a preference, positioning oneself in a better position vis-
d-vis other creditors, and became a "must have" provision in this type of debt instrument. Then
pari passu clauses remained in unsecured debt instruments due to the fear of earmarking revenues
or the risk of the sovereign preferring a group of creditors over another. Additionally, a misguided
interpretation of the pari passu clause in the Elliot case opened the door to litigation on incorrect
grounds (payment or broad interpretation). All these issues created the misconception that the pari
passu clause is needed in unsecured sovereign lending. This article argues the opposite: that there is
no need for a pari passu clause in unsecured sovereign lending except in exceptional circumstances.
I. Introduction
In many cases, countries have amassed unsustainable debt, fueling the increasing need
to restructure; such is the case of Russia, Ukraine, Ecuador, Pakistan, Uruguay, Argentina,
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Iraq and Serbia, and
Montenegro.'
* Assistant Professor at the University of Warwick (UK). The author's email is R.Olivares-
Caminal@warwick.ac.uk. The author would like to thank Mitu Gulati for his comments. The Article also
benefitted from discussions with Gabriel G6mez-Giglio and Octavio M. Zenarruza. Any errors are purely
attributable to the author.
1. There are other cases as well but these are the most sounded episodes since the late 1990s.
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Sovereign states can restructure their debt to prevent or resolve financial and economic
crises and to achieve debt sustainability levels. Sovereign debt restructuring has two as-
pects: procedural and substantial. The procedural aspect focuses on the way the restruc-
turing should be performed, e.g., its architecture, and the substantial aspect focuses on the
actual restructuring of debt, which is normally characterized by rescheduling amortization
schedules as well as writing off the debt principal.
During the 1990s, many sovereign debt restructurings (debt swaps) encountered diffi-
culties because some bondholders did not want to accept the sovereign's exchange
offer, which included a write-off, and instead claimed the total value of the debt. 2
These creditors are known as "holdouts" or "rouge creditors." This practice was
upheld in some court decisions.3
As result of the debt exchange and the fact that after the settlement there are outstanding
bondholders that hold out and do not take part in the exchange offer, the dynamics in the
relationship of the involved parties change. The parties involved are:
(1) The sovereign, debtor of the so-called "old bonds" and the "new bonds." The old
bonds are those held by the holdouts that did not participate in the exchange offer. The
new bonds are those that were issued to creditors as result of the exchange offer, i.e. as
result of the tender of their old bonds for new bonds.
(2) The bondholder who holds an old bond, i.e. the holdout.
(3) The bondholder who holds a new bond, i.e. the creditor that entered the exchange
offer.
Both bondholders, the holdout and the creditor, would like to collect on their bonds.
The holder of the old bond would like to collect the principal amount and accrued inter-
ests by trying to attach any possible assets of the sovereign adopting an active litigation
role. This is different from the role to be performed by the holders of the new bonds who
will have a passive role waiting for their interest payments to become due (usually every six
months), and who will collect the principal upon maturity. In this scenario, the sovereign
debtor does not have many options left. The sovereign debtor has to pay the holders of
the new bonds regularly, to avoid defaulting again, while trying to avoid any attachment
on its assets that will disrupt the flow of payments. The priority of the sovereign debtor is
to maintain the flow of payments to the majority of its creditors while also sorting out
what to do with the holdout minority.
It is relevant to analyze the payment of these debt instruments, and particularly the
payment of the "new bonds," because it implies a flow of funds, and can represent an
attachable asset. But there are three clarifications or distinctions that have to be made ab
initio. First, we must provide an explanation of how to obtain and enforce a judgment in
the United States. The primary focus within the United States will be the state of New
York, where most sovereign debt litigation takes place. Second, we must ascertain
whether the payments are going to be made through a fiscal agent or a trustee. Third, we
2. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EmORY LJ. 1043, 1045 (2004).
3. Jose Garcia-Hamilton et al., The Required Threshold to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 27 LoN'. L.A. LN-r'L &
Comp. L. ReV. 251 (2005). The most relevant cases, which protect holdout creditors and encourage their
practices are analyzed below.
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must ascertain if the payment is going to be performed within the sovereign debtor's
country or abroad. These distinctions are helpful in determining the possibility of success
in performing the payments or the intent to attach the flow of funds, depending from
which perspective it is analyzed. To a certain extent, these two issues are interrelated.
The analysis will follow taking into account the distinctions mentioned in the previous
paragraph, and will continue with an analysis of the most relevant cases that protect
holdout creditors and encourage their practices. Particularly, the infamous Elliot Associ-
ates, L.P.(Elliot) v. Republic of Peru and Banco de la Nacidn cases,4 which were adjudicated
in-among other jurisdictions-New York and Belgium. Elliot is a leading case because a
Belgian court addressed the scope of the pari passu clause, and forced Peru to enter into a
settlement agreement with Elliot to maintain the flow of payments to its creditors unal-
tered (i.e. the holders of the new bonds). Also, the LNC Investments v. Nicaragua cases5
will be analyzed because they are the second part of the part passu saga in Belgium, as well
as other relevant cases.
This study on the paripassu clause in sovereign debt instruments has two parts: (1) Part
1: Understanding the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments. A Complex Quest; and
(2) Part II: To Rank Pari Passu or not to Rank Pari Passu: That is the Question in Sovereign
Bonds after the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga. Part I analyzes the pari passu clause, a
clause that is found in almost every sovereign debt issuance. This study is important be-
cause, as result of a wrongful judicial decision, 6 holdout litigation has developed to pose a
serious threat to the international capital markets and the flow of funds. Part II of this
article will focus on the recent Argentine sovereign debt restructuring exercise, which
might reignite litigation based on the pari passu clause. It is important to stress the differ-
ence between the two scenarios, i.e. litigation before and after Argentina's sovereign debt
exchange offer. Pre-Argentina litigation was based on an incorrect interpretation of the
pari passu clause made by a Belgium court. Post-Argentina potential litigation could be
based on an actual breach of the pari passu clause, in which case, a reawakening of pari
4. See Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of
Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000) (not reported); see also Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F.
Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 961 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Elliott Assocs., L.P.v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. Supp.2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Elliott Assocs., L.P.v. Banco de
la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116; Elliott
Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 54 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
5. LNC Invs., Inc. v. The Republic of Nicaragua, No. 96 Civ. 6360, 2000 US Dist. LEXIS 7738, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2000); La Republique du Nicaragua v. LNC Invs. LLC et Euroclear Bank S.A., R.R. 101/
03 (Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles July 25, 2003) (not reported, on file with the author) (unilateral order
granted by the Vice-president of the Commercial Tribunal of Brussels); Republique du Nicaragua v. LNC
Invs. LLC et Euroclear Bank, No. R.K. 240/03 (Tribunal de Commerce de Bruxelles 2003) (Belg.) (not
reported, on file with author); Republique du Nicaragua v. LNC Invs. LLC, No. 2003/KR/334, at *2 (Court
of Appeals of Brussels, 9th Chamber, 2004] (on file with author).
6. As noted by Galvis, the Elliot case was an erroneous ruling based solely on the opinion of a New York
Professor that has no precedential effect on New York law. See Sergio J. Galvis, Response, Comments on the
Evolution of the Boilerplate Contracts, in Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, The Evolution of Boilerplate Contracts:
Evidence from the Sovereign Debt Market, New York University School of Law-Law and Economics Research
paper Series Research paper No. 05-17 and Georgetown University Law Center-Business Economics and
Regulatory Policy Research paper No. 800264 (2005).
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passu litigation could be triggered. This article is Part I of the study. Part II will be
published in the Law & Business Review of the Americas in 2009.7
H. Preliminary Distinctions
A. A SHORT NOTE ON OBTAINING AND ENFORCING A MONETARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST A SOVEREIGN
A monetary judgment against a sovereign can be obtained in two main ways: by clearing
all jurisdictional hurdles, or by submission to jurisdiction by the sovereign itself. Exercise
of jurisdiction occurs when: (a) the sovereign state has no sovereign immunity; (b) a U.S.
state or federal court has personal jurisdiction over the foreign state and subject matter
jurisdiction over the case; or (c) the intervening court does not refuse to enforce a claim
against a sovereign based on the fact that the sovereign's act is subject to the application of
the U.S. act of state doctrine. Submission to jurisdiction occurs when the sovereign: (a)
submits to the jurisdiction of federal and/or state courts; (b) appointed a process agent;
and (c) expressly waived immunity from suit.
In either case, the creditor would be able to bring a suit, and if is successful, would be
entitled to a judgment entitling it to payment. Upon obtaining a favorable judgment, the
creditor would have many alternatives to enforce the money judgment. But the basic
enforcement device is property execution. Creditors are faced with two alternatives: (1)
execute property within the debtors' territory, or (2) try to execute property abroad.
These two alternatives each have pros and cons.
If the creditor were to execute property in the sovereign state, it would be highly proba-
ble that, due to public order, the judgment would either not be enforced, or if enforced,
payable with debt instruments issued by the sovereign debtor (other bonds if the claim was
based on defaulted bonds) with very unattractive financial terms (e.g., long-term maturity,
subject to local law, and usually trading in a secondary market at steep discount). The
pros are that there would be assets to enforce the money judgment, forcing the sovereign
to settle or be condemned to pay in kind (with bonds). The cons are that the execution
process would be completely uncertain.
On the other hand, if the creditor tries to execute the money judgment abroad, say, in
New York, the pros are that the whole process is clearly defined, and an outcome can be
predicted because there have been many cases where sovereigns have been sued as result
of their default (in opposition to suing in the sovereign's own courts where the process
will be characterized by its uncertainty).8 But the cons are that it would be very difficult to
find assets to enforce the money judgment.
7. It is recommended that the two parts be read as a whole; they each may be accessed through Westlaw®
and LexisNexis®.
8. See generally Pravin Bankers Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peri, 165 B.R. 379 (S.D.N.Y 1994);
PraNin Bankers Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peri, 895 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Pravin Bankers
Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peri, 912 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Pravin Bankers Assocs., Ltd. v.
Banco Popular del Perd, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997); Pravin Bankers Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peri,
9 F. Supp. 2d 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Elliot Assocs. L.P., 948 F. Supp. 1203; 961 F. Supp. 83; 12 F. Supp. 2d
328; 194 F.3d 363; 194 F.R.D. 116, 54 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1023; Lightwater Corp. Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 3804 (TPG), 02 Civ. 3808(TPG), 02 Civ. 5932(TPG), 2003 WL 21146665 (S.D.N.Y.
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Under New York law, a money judgment or order directing the payment of money can
be enforced.9 Section 5101 of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules establishes the
following methods of enforcing a money judgment: (1) before judgment by means of a
restraining order' 0 and after judgment by means of a restraining notice;1' (2) a subpoena
for disclosure 12 and for persons and documents; 13 (3) a proceeding against a third party to
require payment of debts owed to the judgment debtor;' 4 (4) the appoint of a receiver of
property; 15 and (5) execution of property. 16 As previously mentioned, execution of prop-
erty is the most common enforcing device.
B. FISCAL AGENT AN\D TRUST STRUCTURES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT INSTRUMENTS:
BASIC DIFFERENCES
When issuing debt, the sovereign has to choose between using either a fiscal agent or a
trust structure. Under a fiscal agent agreement, a fiscal agent is appointed to handle the
"fiscal"' 17 matters of the issuer (e.g. redeeming bonds and coupons at maturity). Under a
trust structure (trust indenture or trust deed, depending if it is under New York or English
law), a trustee is appointed as a fiduciary to manage matters related to the issuance ensur-
ing that the issuer meets all the terms and conditions of the issuance. The primary differ-
ence between these two structures used in bond issuances is that the fiscal agent acts as a
representative and agent of the issuer while the trustee is a fiduciary representing the
bondholders. The fiscal agent structure has been the prevailing practice in international
bond issuances. But recent bond issuances have shifted to the use of trust structures (e.g.
Argentina on its bonds subject to English and New York law, Belize, Dominica, Ecuador,
Grenada, and Uruguay). 18
The distinction between the fiscal agent and the trustee is a major issue in this analysis.
The difference is that payments done through a trustee cannot be attached because as
soon as the funds are deposited in the trustee's account they are no longer the sovereign's
funds; on the contrary, they are held by the trustee acting on behalf of the creditors. The
case of the fiscal agent is different because the funds held on a fiscal agent account are
funds of the sovereign until those funds are deposited in each creditor's accounts.
C. PLACE OF PAYMENT OF THE DEBT INSTRUMENTS
Until the funds have been deposited in the trust account, they are in transit and subject
to attachments (they still are funds of the sovereign). This is the reason why the place of
May 16, 2003); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 Civ. 2507(TPG), 2003 WL 22120745 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 16, 2003); LNC Invs., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 6360, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7814 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000).
9. NY Civil Practice Law and Rules, (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5101(McKinney 2009)).
10. Id. § 5229.
11. Id. § 5222.
12. Id. § 5223.
13. Id. § 5224.
14. Id. § 5227.
15. Id. § 5228.
16. Id. § 5230.
17. Fiscal is used in a monetary sense as involving financial matters rather than taxes only.
18. See Lee C. Buchheit, Supermajority Control Wins Out, L-Nr'L FIN. L. RFv. (2007).
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payment is relevant and indistinct-because they are in transit-if they are going to be
deposited in the fiscal agent or the trustee's account. There are two possible scenarios:
that the fiscal agent or the trustee has an account to have the funds deposited outside, or
inside the sovereign's jurisdiction. If the account is held outside the sovereign's jurisdic-
tion, the funds can be threatened by an attachment. The second scenario, i.e. an account
within the sovereign's jurisdiction, requires a two-fold analysis: (1) the case of the fiscal
agent and (2) the case of the trustee. In the case of the fiscal agent with an account within
the jurisdiction of the sovereign, the situation would be the same as in the case of an
account outside the jurisdiction because the fiscal agent will have to repatriate the funds
(transfer the funds to the place of payment) to arrange the payments to the sovereign's
creditors on its behalf. The case of the trustee is different because funds can be safely
deposited in the trustee's account within the sovereign's jurisdiction and then transferred
abroad. Once the funds have safely reached the trustee's account, the ownership over
those funds is transferred to the creditors' via the fiduciary duty of the trustee.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the governmental funds within its own jurisdiction
remains safe because the government will arbitrate the required mechanisms to shield said
funds from potential attachments. Shielding could be accomplished by either enacting an
executive decree or compelling the legislative branch pass an emergency law in favor of
the stability and wellbeing of the country's economy, overruling the rule of law if
necessary.
II. The Infamous Elliot Case and Other Relevant Legal Precedents
This section aims to analyze the Elliot case, which is directly related to the pari passu
clause in sovereign debt instruments. First, as an introduction to the Elliot case, the Pravin
Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru cases' 9 will be considered. These cases are the
bedrock for the action initiated by Elliot Associates L.P. in the infamous Elliot cases. The
analysis is then followed by the Elliot case. It has been argued that prior to the Elliot case,
the pari passu clause appeared to be meaningless, and even harmless in the context of
sovereign debt instruments 20.
A. PRAVIN BANKER ASSOCIATES V. BANco POPULAR DEL PERU
Pravin Banker Associates (Pravin) invested in Banco Popular del Peru's (Banco Popular)
debt.21 Banco Popular's main shareholder, Republic of Peru (Peru), collateralized the
debt.22 Due to Peru's financial crisis in 1985,23 Banco Popular defaulted on its principal
19. See Pravin Bankers Assocs. Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peri, 165 B.R. 379 (S.D.N.Y 1994); Pravin Bank-
ers Assocs. Ltd., 895 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Pravin Bankers Assocs. Ltd., 912 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Pravin Bankers Assocs. Ltd., 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997); Pravin Bankers Assocs. Ltd., 9 F.Supp. 2d
300 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
20. See Michael Bradley, James D. Cox & Mira Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and their
Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/duke fs/120.
21. See Pravin Banker Assocs., 109 F.3d at 852.
22. Id.
23. The then President of Peru, Alan Garcia (which happens to have been re-elected and currently sits in
the Presidential chair), in a memorable speech stated that: "[w]e will begin a dialogue with our creditors
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payments on the debt.24 Pravin, after sending a notice to the defaulted debtor, claimed
payment for the total outstanding debt.25 Peru appointed a liquidation committee to
restructure Banco Popular's debt.26 Pravin refused to participate in Peru's liquidation
process, and filed a claim for the payment of its debt (at a nominal value) against Banco
Popular and Peru.27
At trial, Peru stated that Pravin had bought Peruvian debt at a substantial discount over
its face value and that a total recovery of the debt could not be considered by any party. A
total recovery would have resulted in an unjust enrichment and would have allowed Pravin
to obtain an unexpected gain due to Peru's disgrace. In Pravin Banker Associates v. Banco
Popular del Peru, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit balanced two
principles to determine if international comity should be extended: (1) the success of
public debt restructuring, including International Monetary Fund's (IMF) involvement
under the Brady Plan; and (2) the payment of valid debts under contract law principles. 2R
After having granted two waiting periods (six and two months respectively), the Second
Circuit held that Pravin was not obligated to abide by the Brady Plan because the partici-
pation of creditors in such restructuring processes was strictly voluntarily.29 Additionally,
the Second Circuit believed that an undefined suspension of the proceedings would
prejudice U.S. interests (the respect of the terms and conditions of valid contracts exe-
cuted under U.S. law). 30
B. ELLIOTT ASSOCIATES, L.P. v. REPUBLIC OF PERU AND BANCO DE LA NACION
After Pravin, Peru found itself in court again in Elliot Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru.
Elliot Associates, L.P. ("Elliot") was a vulture fund that in 1996 had purchased defaulted
bonds in the secondary market with a steep discount. Elliot purchased bonds of a face
value of $20.7 million dollars and paid $11.4 million dollars.31
The decision of the District Court in favor of Peru32 was reversed when the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the purchase of Peru's distressed sovereign debt with
the intention to bring suit was not in violation of section 489 of New YorkJudiciary Court
Acts. 33 Section 489 prohibits the purchase of a claim "with the intent and for the purpose
of bringing an action or proceeding thereon." 34
without using the International Monetary Fund as a middleman and for the next 12 months and while situa-
tions do not change, we will only devote to the service of the foreign debt not more than 10% of the total
value of our exports and not the 60% that has been demanded." Thereafter, the foreign debt payments were
suspended for six months to stimulate economic domestic growth.
24. Pravin Banker Assocs., 109 F.3d at 852.
25. Id. at 853.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 855.
29. Id.; See also Int'l Debt Mgmt. Authority, 22 U.S.C. § 5331(b)(4) (1998).
30. See Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd., 109 F.3d at 855.
31. Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru, Final Report on the Elliot case (Sept. 2000) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Final Report on the Elliot case].
32. Elliot Assocs., L.P., 12 F. Supp. 2d 328.
33. Elliot Assocs., L.P., 194 F.3d at 372.
34. N.Y. Jud. Ct. Acts § 489 (McKinney 2004).
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The Court of Appeals held that the investor did not violate the law because the debt
instrument was acquired for the primary purpose of enforcing it, with the intent to resort
to litigation only if necessary to accomplish the enforcement. 35 The decision to file a
claim was the consequence of not performing the payment.36
As in Pravin, the Court of Appeals balanced two aspects: (1) granting the possibility to
U.S. citizen bondholders to claim the payment of their credit, which limited the chances
of achieving debt restructuring under the IMF's umbrella; and (2) not allowing the claim
because it would prejudice New York as a world financial center. 37 Both issues were im-
portant for U.S. foreign affairs policy.38 The Court of Appeals believed that the protec-
tion of investors was a priority. 39
The peculiarity of this case, although similar to the Pravin case, was that the lack of
assets to attach in the United States forced the claimant to resort to the Courts of
Belgium, Canada, England, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to seek enforce-
ment of the decision.40 But it is worth noting that attachment orders were previously
obtained in different U.S. states (Florida, Maryland, New York, and Washington D.C.),
which interfered with the performance of payments by the fiscal agent.41 Therefore, Peru
arranged for the creation of a trust to disburse the biannual interest payments due on the
Brady Bonds.42
After a reversal on first instance, Elliot obtained a restraining order from a Brussels
Court of Appeals on September 26, 2000, 43 prohibiting Chase Manhattan (the financial
agent) and Euroclear to pay interests on Peru's Brady Plan bonds (approximately $80
million dollars that were due on October 6, 2000). 44 The Court of Appeals resolution
stated that "[it ... appears from the basic agreement that governs the repayment of the
foreign debt of Peru that the various creditors benefit from a pari passu clause that in effect
provides that the debt must be repaid pro rata among all creditors."45
The Brady bonds were issued as the result of a sovereign debt restructuring in which
Elliot decided not to take part.46 With the judicial order barring payments, Peru was
facing default on the restructured bonds totalizing $3.837 billion dollars.47 Although Peru
35. See Elliot Assocs, L.P., 194 F.3d at 372.
36. Id. at 379.
37. John Nolan, Special Policy Report 3: Emerging Market Debt & Vulture Hedge Funds: Free-Ridersbip, Legal
& Market Remedies, FINANCIAL POLICY FORUM: DERIVATIVES STUDY FORUM, Sept. 29, 2001, http://
www.financialpolicy.org/DSCNolan.html.
38. See Samuel E. Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in tbe Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in
Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 5 UCLA J. L'sT'L L. & FOREIGN A-F. 159, 196 (2000).
39. Garcia-Hamilton et al., supra note 3, at 253.
40. See Eduardo Luis L6pez Sandoval, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Should We Be Worried About El-
liot? 12 (May 2002) (unpublished paper for Seminar on International Financial Law, Harvard Law School)
(on file with Harvard Law School).
41. Id.
42. See Final Report on the Elliot case, sitpra note 3 1; Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru, Resolu-
tion No. 140-2000-EF/75 (in relation to the trust structure) [hereinafter Resolution No. 140-2000-EF/75].
43. Elliot Assocs., L.P., 2000/QR/92.
44. Id. These payments were going to be made by the Fiscal Agent (Chase Manhattan Bank) through
Depositary Trust Company (DTC) in New York, Euroclear in Brussels, and Clearstream in Luxemburg.
45. Id.
46. Resolution No. 140-2000-EF/75, supra note 42.
47. See Final Report on the Elliot case, supra note 31.
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did not make the payment of interests on the due date, it technically had a thirty-day
period to fulfill the payment before the default was declared.48 As noted by L6pez-Sando-
val, Elliot's strategy was two-fold: (1) trying to attach the funds at the level of the fiscal
agent; and (2) capturing funds at the level of the clearinghouses.49
Facing this situation, Peru abandoned the trust structure because not only were pay-
ments through the Depository Trust Company (DTC) curtailed as result of the attach-
ment orders in different states in the United States, but also through Euroclear.50 The
only window left open-although temporarily-was to perform the payments through
Clearstream.1 Performing the interest payments through Clearstream would have im-
plied that only those bondholders holding an account with Clearstream would be paid or
that bondholders not holding an account with Clearstream should open an account there
(which implied an additional cost to Peru). 52 Additionally, it was only a matter of time
before Elliot would obtain a restraining order in Luxembourg.
This scenario forced Peru to reach an agreement with Elliott in order to avoid a new
default on its restructured debt under the auspices of the Brady Plan.5 3 On September 28,
2000, Peru enacted Urgent Decree No. 083-2000 and Resolution No. 143-2000-EF of
the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru to negotiate and settle Elliot's claim.54
These norms were complemented by Urgent Decree No. 084-2000, which authorized a
loan granted by the National Bank to the Ministry of Economy and Finance to procure
the required funds to settle Elliot's claim.5 5
The total debt calculated as of September 30, 2000 equaled $57,466,592.85.56 To this
sum, nine million dollars would be added for legal expenses.57 The final settlement agree-
ment implied a payment in the total amount of $58.45 million dollars.5 8 The settlement
agreement was executed on September 29, 2000 and ratified by Supreme Decree No. 106-
2000-EF.59 General releases were executed together with the settlement. Finally, Peru
was able to pay the due interests in time avoiding incurring in a new default. By means of
this agreement, Elliott obtained a gain worth four hundred percent of the purchase value
of the defaulted bonds. 60
The decision of the Belgium Court of Appeals was grounded on the violation of equal
treatment of creditors under the pari passu clause. An analysis on the scope, interpreta-
tion, and judicial reception of this clause follows.
48. Resolution No. 140-2000-EF/75, supra note 42.
49. See Sandoval, supra note 40.
50. Elliott Associates, L.P., A.R. Nr. 2000/QR/92.
51. Final Report on the Elliot case, supra note 31.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Final Report on the Elliot case, supra note 31.
55. See Urgent Decree No. 084-2000 of Sept. 30, 2000, El Peruano [Official Gazette of Peru], Sept. 30,
2000, p. 193408.
56. See Final Report on the Elliot case, svpra note 31.
57. Id.
58. Settlement Agreement among the Republic of Peru, Banco de la Nacion, Baker & Hostetler, Elliot
Associates LP, and Deschert Price & Rhoads (Sept. 29, 2000) (on file with author).
59. See Supreme Decree No. 106-2000-EF of Sept. 29, 2000, El Peruano [Official Gazette of Peru], Sept.
30, 2000, p. 193409.
60. Nolan, suipra note 37; see also Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 Bus. LAWv. 635
(2001).
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IV. Understanding the Pari Passu Clause: A Complex Quest
The great commotion around the pani passu clause is that, as of 2000, various creditors
in different jurisdictions (Belgium, California, England, and New York) have argued that
as result of the pari passu clause, sovereigns should be prevented from making payments to
other creditors without paying the litigating creditors on a pro rata basis. 61
To understand the papasu clause, it is necessary to first understand the meaning of the
short Latin phrase pari passu. In this respect, pani passu literally means "with equal step,"
from the Latin pari, ablative of par, "equal" and passu, ablative of passus, "step." That is to
say, that pai passu refers to things that are in same situation; things that rank equally. In
1900, Palmer expressed that "[t]here is no special virtue in the words 'pari passu', 'equally'
would have the same effect or any other words showing that the [bonds] were intended to
stand on the same level footing without preference or priority among themselves. .. 62
The pari passu clause, as brilliantly noted by Buchheit, "is short, obscure and sports a bit of
Latin; all characteristics that lawyers find endearing." 63
A pari passiu clause is a standard clause included in public or private international un-
secured debt obligations (syndicated loan agreements and bond issuances). Buchheit and
Pam have traced the origins of this clause, and have discovered that it was used in un-
secured cross-border debt instruments in the early 1970s. 64
In the case of bond issuances, the pari passu clause reads as follows:
The Securities are general, direct, unconditional, unsubordinated, and unsecured ob-
ligations of [Country XYZ] for the payment and performance of which the full faith
and credit of [Country XYZ] has been pledged and [Country XYZ] shall ensure that
its obligations hereunder shall rank pani passu among themselves and with all of its
other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated Public Debt.65
From a close reading of the clause, it can be argued that it has two limbs: (1) an internal
limb, in which the bonds will rank pani passu with each other; and (2) an external limb, in
which the bonds will rank pari passu with other unsecured (present or future) indebtedness
of the issuer.66
But not all pari passu clauses are drafted in the same format. They vary according to its
drafter, denoting diversity in the language of the same clause that might derive from dif-
ferent interpretations. Therefore, a pari passu clause can also read as follows:
The Notes and Coupons of all Series constitute direct, unconditional, unsecured and
unsubordinated obligations of [Country XYZ] and shall at all times rank pai passu
61. Pari Passu Clause: Analysis of the Role, Use and Meaning of Pari Passu Clauses in Sovereign Debt Obligations
as a Matter of English Law 3 FIN. MARKETS LAW COMM'T IssuE) 79 (2005), available at http://www.fmlc.org/
papers/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf [hereinafter Financial Markets Law Committee].
62. FRANCIS B. PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS: FOR USE IN RELATION TO COMPANIES SUBJECT TO
THE COMPANiES AcT, 1862-1890: WrrIH Copious NOTES AND AN APPENDIX CON'AINING ACTS AND
RULES, 109-10. (8th ed. 1902).
63. LEE C. BUCIIElT, How To NEGO nATE EUROCURRENCy LOAN AGREEMFNTS 82 (2d ed. 2004).
64. See Lee Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The View From the Legal
Academy: The Pari Passi Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 902 (2004).
65. Offering Memorandum by the Government of Belize Press Office, Dec. 18, 2006, B.O. 142 (for the
exchange of U.S. Dollar Bonds due 2029) (emphasis added).
66. Pari Passu Clause, supra note 61, at 4.
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and without any preference among themselves .... The payment obligations of the
[Country XYZ] under the Notes and the Coupons shall at all times rank at least equally with
all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.67
This second type of paripassu clause complicates things more because it invites two possi-
ble interpretations. These possible interpretations are: (1) the narrow or "ranking" inter-
pretation, where obligations of the debtor rank, and will rank pari passu with all other
unsecured debt; and (2) the broad or "payment" interpretation, that when the debtor is
unable to pay all of its obligations, they will be paid on a pro rata basis. Wood is of the
opinion that the key word is "rank" and that "rank" means "rank," not "will pay," or "will
give equal treatment." 68
According to Buchheit and Pam, the broad or "payment" interpretation has four practi-
cal implications: (1) it may provide a legal basis for a creditor to seek specific performance
of the covenant (i.e. a court order directing the debtor not to pay other debts of equal rank
without making a ratable payment under the debt benefiting from the clause); (2) it may
provide a legal basis for a judicial order directed to a third-party creditor instructing that
creditor not to accept a payment from the debtor unless the pari passu-protected lender
receives a ratable payment; (3) it may provide a legal basis for a court order directing a
third-party financial intermediary such as a fiscal agent or a bond clearing system to freeze
any non-ratable payment received from the debtor and to turn over to the pari passu-
protected creditor its ratable share of the funds; and (4) it may make a third-party creditor
that has knowingly received and accepted a non-ratable payment answerable to the pari
passu-protected creditor for a ratable share of the funds. 6 9
In this regard, the Elliot case 70 sets an ex ante and ex post situation in relation to the
interpretation of the pari passu clause. The ex ante situation was that the only possible
interpretation of the clause was the narrow or ranking interpretation, and that it was in-
cluded to avoid the creation of preferences either by the sovereign (paying one or some
creditors in detriment of others) or by creditors. 71 This is the reason why commercial
banks in the early 1970s started using the clause in unsecured debt instruments. 72 Particu-
larly, two countries originated the inclusion of the pari passu clauses in unsecured debt
instruments: Spain and the Philippines. 73
Article 913(4) of the Spanish Commercial Code and article 1924(3)(a) of the Spanish
Civil Code refer to the preference of creditors whose credit is instrumented by means of a
public deed (notarized by a Notary Public).74 This type of credit had a preference over
67. Clause included in the Information Memorandum of the Republic of Argentina of a Medium Term
Note Programme of $15 billion dollars (Oct. 31, 2000); see Philip R. Wood, Pari Passu Clauses- What Do They
Mean?, Vol. 18, No. 10 BuTrERWORTHSJ. OF INT'L BANKING & FIN. L., 373 (Nov. 2003) (emphasis added).
According to Wood, the statement that bonds are direct, unconditional, and other adjectives does not add
anything and could safely be omitted.
68. Id. at 372.
69. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 64, at 903.
70. Elliot Assoc., L.P., No. 2000/QR/92.
71. Id.
72. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 64, at 903.
73. Id.
74. The Spanish Insolvency Law 22/2003 of July 9, 2003 amended section 1924 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Although under section 91of the new insolvency law a whole new ranking of preferences not including credits
instrumented through public deeds is included, subsection (3)(a) of section 1924 of the Spanish Civil Code
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those even if of the same type-not instrumented in a public deed. 75 The Philippines,
which was strongly influenced by the Spanish Civil Code, has a norm similar to that of
Spain. Article 2244(14) of the Philippines Civil Code grants priority to those credits that
appear in a public instrument or a final judgment.76 These two cases are the main reason
for the emergence of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt bond instruments.77
After the decision of the Belgium court in the Elliot case, other cases followed. Credi-
tors were willing to benefit from the broad or "payment" interpretation. This is the expost
situation. The analysis of these cases follows.
has not been amended. Therefore, in the event of sovereign issuances-not subject to insolvency laws the
un-amended section 1924(3)(a) of the Civil Code still applies.
75. See Philip Wood, International Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTER-
NATIONAL FINANcE 41 (1995).
76. An Act to Ordain and Institute the Civil Code of the Philippines, Rep. Act. No. 386, § 2244(14) (1949),
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/civilcodeofthephilippinesbook4.htm ("Credits which, without special
privilege, appear in (a) a public instrument; or (b) in a final judgment, if they have been the subject of litiga-
tion. These credits shall have preference among themselves in the order of priority of the dates of the instru-
ments and of the judgments, respectively.").
77. Buchheit and Pam also consider Argentina as a country that forced the inclusion oftheparipassu clause
since in 1972 re-enacted a practice dating back to 1862 where foreign creditors where subordinated to local
creditors in the bankruptcy of an Argentine debtor. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 64, at 905 (quoting
Emilio J. Cardenas, International Lending: Subordination of Foreign Claims Under Argentine Bankruptcy Law,
DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING 63 (David Suratgar ed., 1984)).
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A. THE RED MouNTArN CASE (CALIFORNIA)
In Red Mountain Financial Inc. v. Democratic Republic of Congo and National Bank of
Congo,78 the court was requested to enforce different provisions of a credit agreement
between the plaintiff and defendants. Among the provisions was a pari passu clause from a
1980 credit agreement.79 The United States District Court for the Central District of
California expressly denied the performance of the pari passu clause, but nonetheless en-
joined Congo from making any payments relating to its external indebtedness without
making a proportionate payment to Red Mountain.8 0 Finally, the parties settled the case.
B. THE KENSINGTON INTERNATIONAL CASE (ENGLAND)
In Kensington International Ltd. v. Republic of Congo,sI the pari passu clause was again
wnder scrutiny. This was an English case where the plaintiff sought to recover defaulted
debt82 governed by a loan agreement subject to English law, and to prevent the Republic
of Congo from making payments to other creditors based, inter alia, on a pari passu
clause. 83 The intervening judge denied the plaintiffs request 84 on other grounds, and his
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals.85 It has been stated that the views on the
pari passu clause in this case "are of persuasive authority only."'86
C. THE KENSINGTON INTERNATIONAL CASE 11 (NEW YORK)
The Kensington saga had a part two in New York. This case is very interesting because
it gave the pari passu clause a new twist, taking it to another level after the novel interpre-
tation of the pari passu in the Elliot case. 87 On August 13, 2003, Kensington International
Limited v. BNP Paribas S.A. was filed in a New York state court.88 Kensington argued that
BNP tortuously interfered with Kensington's rights to collect the monies due from the
Republic of Congo as per the pani passu clause included in the 1984 loan agreement giving
raise to the plaintiff's credit against Congo.8 9 The plaintiff argued that BNP had received
78. Red Mountain Fin, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, No. CV 00-0164 R (C.D. Cal. May 29,
2001).
79. ld.
80. Id. Congo and its central bank were "enjoined from making any payments to be made on their behalves
with respect to any External Indebtedness... unless and until Congo and its [central bank] (or each one of
them) make or cause to made a proportionate payment to Red Mountain at the same time.
81. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 709 (Eng.).
82. Id. The debt was acquired after Congo defaulted on the loan agreement.
83. The relevant part of the pari passu clause reads as follows: "IThe claims of all other parties under [the
loan] agreement will rank as general obligations of the People's Republic of the Congo, at least pari passu in
right and priority of payment with the claims of all other creditors of the People's Republic of the Congo
Id.
84. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, [2002] E'WHC (Comm) 1088, 6:13-16 (Eng.), affd, 2003
1VL 1935493 (C.A. May 13, 2003).
85. Kensington Int'l Ltd. [2003] EWCA (Civ) 709.
86. Pari Passu Clause, supra note 61.
87. An example of a case of tortuous liability for breach of contractual provision prior to the Elliot interpre-
tation is the Citibank N.A. v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, No. 76 Civ. 3514 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 9, 1976).
88. See Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 03602569 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Aug. 13, 2003).
89. Id.
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payments from new financings entered into by the defendant and Congo after 1985.90 In
other words, BNP collected money without distributing it on a pro rata basis with Ken-
sington as result of the broad or "payment" interpretation of the pari passu clause. The
case was eventually settled and the interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt
instruments under New York law is still a pending issue.
D. THE LNC CASE (BELGIUM)
In 1999, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ren-
dered a decision in LNC Investments, Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, in which Nicaragua was
obligated to pay eighty-seven million dollars resulting from defaulted commercial loans
granted in the 1980s.91 LNC Investments preferred to file a claim rather than participate
in the successful sovereign debt restructuring procedure. 92 Following the Elliot precedent,
LNC Investments enforced the U.S. decision in a Brussels Court.93 As in Elliott, LNC
Investments obtained a judicial order that prohibited the payment of interest on restruc-
tured bonds.94 The order was directed to both Deustche Bank AG, as fiscal agent, and
Euroclear. 95
The decision was appealed by Nicaragua, and the Brussels Court of Appeals reversed
the decision. 96 Even though it seems that the Brussels courts reversed the criteria set
forth in the Elliott case, this conclusion is premature because the Brussels court did not
directly consider the paripassu clause. The case was resolved on procedural grounds-the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision because Euroclear was not a proper party to the
litigation.97
V. A Short Note on Multilateral Debt Payments Vis-i-Vis the Pari Passu
Clause
The Financial Markets Law Committee has noted that in the event that a sovereign is
not able to service its debt, due to the broad or "payment" interpretation, it will not be
allowed to pay the IMF, World Bank, other multilateral organizations, or its government
ministers, civil servants, police force, armed forces, judges, and state teachers. 98 Because a
sovereign cannot bring its essentials services to a halt (even on an event of default), the
broad or "payment" interpretation seems not to be the correct one.
A particular note should be made of the preferred status of the IMF and other multilat-
eral organizations because (a) it is a recurring issue, and (b) because this priority does not
90. Id.
91. LNC Inv., Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, No. 96 Civ. 6360, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7738, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2000).
92. LNC Inv., Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, 115 F. Supp. 2d 358. 360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
93. Republique Du Nicaragua v. LNC Inv. LLC, No. 2003/KR/334, at 2 (Cour D'Appeal de Bruselas
[Neuvieme Chambre] 2004) (on file with author).
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 19.
97. See William W. Bratton, Pari Passu andA Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, 53 EMORY LJ. 823, 824
n.9 (2004).
98. Pari Passu Clauese, snpra note 61.
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emanate from any norm; it is a general understanding that has only been challenged by
means of the pari passu clause. As noted by the IMF, the preferred creditor status is funda-
mental to its financial responsibilities and its financing mechanism. 99 In addition, the
President of the World Bank has stated that "[tlhe pari passu clause, for example, does not
prevent a debtor from, as a matter of practice, discriminating in favor of international
financial institutions such as the [World] Bank and the IMF in making debt service pay-
ments." 00 Duvall has noticed that many developing countries have continued to make
payments to multilateral financial institutions even when they were unable to service com-
mercial bank loans. 1'0 He also argues that the so-called "preferred creditor status" of the
World Bank rests on practical considerations rather than legal grounds, and thus, is not
thought to violate such countries' pari passu undertakings.
But most important, the World Bank's preferred status is a result of the International
Lender of Last Resort role (ILOLR) of the IMF that not only benefits its members but
other creditors (bilateral and private) that see themselves in a better position due to the
assistance provided by the IMF to the sovereign to regain sustainability and an orderly
restructuring. The ILOLR function is performed by the IMF when other credit providers
are not willing to lend as result of the deteriorated situation of the country. To a certain
extent, an analogy can be made between the ILOLR and the preference granted to those
that provide DIP financing under section 364(d) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 02
VI. The Interaction of the Pari Passu Clause Jointly with Other Clauses in
Legal Instruments
Also, if, according to the broad or "payment" interpretation, the paripassu clause should
be understood as a pro-rata distribution rule upon default, why has a "sharing clause" been
included side by side with the pari passu clause in some debt instruments? A sharing clause
is a common feature of syndicated loans to guarantee that if one of the members of the
syndicate received a greater payment, it will share ratably with the other members. As
Buchheit and Pam have noted, the sharing clause can be three or four pages long, while
the pari passu clause, in three or four lines, achieves the same result without mentioning
the word "share" or one of its synonyms. 10 3 These authors also pose the following hypo-
thetical questions: What would happen if a creditor that has sued to recover on a de-
faulted bond containing a pari passu clause collects the money? Because the creditor knew
of the inclusion of the pai passu clause, would the creditor act as a trustee of its fellow
bondholders and hold the funds for a ratable distribution? 104 This was the argument used
99. International Monetary Fund [IMF], Financial Risk in the Fund and the Level of Precautionary Balances
(Feb. 3, 2004) (prepared by the Finance Department in consultation with other departments), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/risk/2004/020304.pdf.
100. See Memorandum from Barber B. Conable, President, World Bank, to Executive Directors, Review of
IBRD's Negative Pledge Policy with Respect to Debt and Debt Service Reduction Operations (July 19, 1990)
(on file with author).
101. THoMAs A. DUVALL, LEGAL AsPEcrs OF SOVEREIGN LENDING IN EXT'ERNAL DEBT MANAGEMEN:
AN INTRODUCTION 43-4 (Thomas M. Klein ed., The World Bank 1994).
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994).
103. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 64, at 884.
104. Id. at 888.
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in Kensington International Limited v. BNP Paribas S.A.,105 discussed above. Nonetheless,
the aim of the sharing clause is to suppress litigation, so if the latter is the correct interpre-
tation it will collide with the interests of those pursuing litigation. 106
Similarly, the use of the "most favored creditor" clause can also be questioned. The aim
of this clause, which is common in workout agreements, is to ensure that if one creditor is
paid, others will be paid as well. It works as an inverse cross-default clause. This type of
clause usually includes a list of exceptions (e.g., secured senior debts).
In some agreements of different type, why is it that a pari passu clause can be found
together with either a sharing clause or a most-favored-creditor clause if in the end each
clause will produce similar effects? 107 Simply put, the broad or "payment" sense is not the
correct interpretation of the pari passu clause.
Another fact that should be considered in analyzing the feasibility of the broad or "pay-
ment" interpretation is that it will foster holdout creditors disrupting an orderly restruc-
turing against what have been endorsed in G-7 and G-10 statements. 08 As noted by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Belgian interpretation of pari passu, favors collec-
tion over settlement. 09 Moreover, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1998 and the
structuring of the "new financial architecture," the G-10 governments and the IMF sug-
gested the use of CACs and sharing clauses in sovereign bonds. 10 Why would they sug-
gest such a thing if the pari passu clause achieves the same effect? Were they aware of the
existence of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments? The answer again is that
they were aware of the clause, but that the broad or "payment" interpretation is wrong.
Because the pari passu clause does not entail sharing on a pro-rata basis, they were propos-
ing the inclusion of a "sharing" clause. The counter reaction to this proposal was the
rejection of the sharing clause proposal by the investor community."' But why did they
reject the proposal? Was this feature not already available in sovereign debt instruments
by means of the pari passu clause? Again, it seems that everyone but a few (Elliot, the
105. See Kensington Int'l Ltd., No. 03602569.
106. Lee C. Buchheit, Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, 18 N-r'L FIN. L. REv., 17 (1998)
("A true maverick creditor will not much like the presence of a sharing clause in a bond issue it is about to
buy. Mavericks buy debt instruments on the secondary market at steep discounts from their face value after
the borrower gets into financial trouble ... If the terms of a particular bond render it unsuitable for litiga-
tion, the maverick is not likely to buy that bond."); Lee C. Buchheit, The Sharing Clause as a Litigation Shield,
9 L,zr'L FIN. L. REV. 15 (1990).
107. Pari Passu Clause, supra note 61. Sharing clauses are difficult to implement in bonds due to their bearer
nature. But, trust structures sometimes include certain obligations similar to a sharing clause.
108. See Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Communiqu6 of the Ministers and Governors of the
Group of Ten (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p020927.htm.; See also Report, Bank for
Int'l Settlements, Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses (Sept. 2002) available at http:I/
www.bis.org/publ/gtenO8.htm; See also Press Release, U.S. Dep't. Of the Treasury, Statement of G-7 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
po3473.htm.
109. Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Federal Reserve Bank of New York in Support of Defendant's
Motion for an Order Pursuant to CPLR § 5240 Denying Plaintiffs the Use of Injunctive Relief to Prevent
Payments to Other Creditors, Macrotecnic Int'l Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02-CV-5932 (TPG)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2004), available at http://www.theclearinghouse.org/reference/amicuscuriae/000566.pdf.
110. Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], G-22 Report of the Working Group on International Financial Crises, at 20
(Oct. 1998), available at www.imf.org/extemallnp/g22/ifcrep.pdf.
111. Edward Luce, Pakistan'A Warning to Bond Holders, FIN. TimES, Feb. 18, 1999, at 6. The head of the
International Primary Market Association expressly stated that "the market opposes the sharing clause .... "
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Brussels Court of Appeals, Red Mountain, etc.) got the correct interpretation of the
clause.
Another question that must be answered is why the pari passu clause migrated from
syndicated loans to sovereign bond issuances. The answer to this question can be found in
the arguments advocated by Tudor that the pai passut clause is intended: (1) to prevent the
earmarking of revenues of the government towards a single creditor; (2) against legal mea-
sures which have the effect of preferring one set of creditors against the others (e.g. enact-
ing a specific norm); and/or (3) against legal measures which discriminate between
creditors."12 While the first two risks have been covered by an expanded negative pledge
clausel 13 and judicial decisions," 4 the third is still an open issue and a rationale for the
existence of the pari passu clause in unsecured debt instruments." 5
But another more valid interpretation is that this clause had a tendency to migrate,
through the ignorance or inattention of contract drafters, from, cross-border corporate
syndicated loan agreements to sovereign bond issuances. The following paragraph ex-
plains the "migration process:"
[T]he permanent bedrock upon which rests the activity of the entire legal profession
is plagiarism... the mythical fellow who prepared the first loan agreement for a sover-
eign borrower marked up a loan agreement for a corporate borrower ... [tihe process
was then repeated countless thousands of times until some lawyer somewhere was
told to go off and draft the first sovereign debt restructuring agreement, and he or
she just naturally fulfilled this commission by marking up the last sovereign loan
agreement. And that, as they say, was that.' 16
In addition, the clause has remained in sovereign debt instruments due to the potential
risks of coming across another situation such as that in Spain or the Philippines. But with
well conducted due diligence there is no need to include a pari passu clause in sovereign
bond issuances. The real question to be answered is to which risk are drafters of bond
documents more averse: (1) the risk of not being aware of another case similar to Spain or
the Philippines where creditors can better their position by notarizing their credit; or (2)
the risk that the sovereign might be sued as result of the pari passu interpretation with an
uncertain outcome.
112. See William Tudor John, Sovereign Risk and Immunity Under English Law and Practice, in INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 95-96 (Robert S. Rendell ed., 1983) (1980).
113. See Citibank N.A., No. 76 Civ. 3514. The inclusion of expanded negative pledge clauses was the mar-
ket reaction to action initiated by Citibank against Export-Import Bank of the United States, which in the
end was settled by the parties.
114. See Allied Bank Int'l. v. Banco Credito Agrfcola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985); see Libra Bank
Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In these cases it was con-
cluded that U.S. federal courts do not need to refer to the actions or norms emanated from a foreign govem-
ment if there are connecting elements to the United States, e.g. place of payment or governing law.
115. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 64, at 913.
116. Lee Buchheit, Negative Pledge Clauses: The Games People Play, 9 INr'L FIN. L. REv. 10 (1990). This is
the greamess of an experienced lawyer that has no problem admitting that which others protect like the holy
grail: to cut and paste or using his own words 'the bedrock' of the legal profession. I practiced for various
years in international law firms dealing with complex international transactions and can vouch that lawyers
work on pre-drafted versions of documents. This does not necessarily mean that there is no added value in a
lawyer re-shaping a document for each transaction, on the contrary, there is added value. But, in the pursuit
of justice it is also fair to stress that it is easy to replicate unnecessary clauses.
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VII. A New Legislative Development Affecting the Application of the Pari
Passu Clause
To provide comprehensive coverage of the pari passu clause, a reference should also be
made to a relative recent legislative development in Belgium. Law 4765 [C-2004/03482]
was passed on November 19, 2004, reinforcing Article 9 of the Belgian Law of 28 April
1999 that implemented in Belgium the E.U. Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council of May 19, 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement
systems (the E.U. Settlement Finality Directive ).117 It became effective in December of
the same year.
Although the EU Settlement Finality Directive does not prevent attachments, the ob-
jective, by reinforcing the law implementing this directive, was to shield the flow of funds
through Euroclear. The text of the reformed norm reads as follows:
No cash settlement account with a settlement system operator or agent, nor any
transfer of money to be credited to such cash settlement account, via a Belgian or
foreign credit institution, may in any manner whatsoever be attached, put under trus-
teeship or blocked by a participant (other than the settlement system operator or
agent), a counterparty or a third party.'" 8
According to the explanatory memorandum that accompanied the new law (Law 4765 [C-
2004/03482]), the aim is to avoid disruptive actions by creditors by attaching cash ac-
counts held with Belgium clearing systems or obtaining injunctions such as the ones ob-
tained by Elliot and LNC. i19
Although this law protects the flow of funds made through Euroclear from the attach-
ments or liens of creditors, the latter might resort to other jurisdictions or strategies to
force a settlement. A clear example is the attachment that was levied on the Argentine
bonds tendered by those creditors who accepted the debt exchange offer, which resulted
in a delay in the settlement of the bonds. 12° Technically though, the attachment was not
levied on the bonds because the Republic of Argentina was not the owner of the bonds
until a settlement under the exchange offer was finalized. The attachment was levied on
Argentina's future right to receive such bonds,121 which was originally scheduled for April
1, 2005, and was postponed until the attachment was finally released.i 22
117. See generally Council Directive 98/26/EC, 1998 OJ. (L 166) 45.
118. ld. art. 15. The quote corresponds to the amendment introduced in November 2004.
119. See Cbambres des Reprisentants de Belgique Doc. 51 1157/011 (2004) (on file with the author).
120. EM Ltd v. Republic of Arg., 131 Fed. App'x 745 (2d Cir. 2005). NML Capital Ltd. and EM Ltd.
moved to attach the bonds tendered in the 2005 exchange offer of the Republic of Argentina. The plaintiffs
were seeking to attach these bonds, which were held by the Bank of New York (Fiduciary and Payment
Agent), and had been tendered by the bondholders in order to receive the new bonds being issued as result of
the exchange offer. Their main argument was that they were held by the Bank of New York on behalf of the
Argentine Government, who will have a future right on the bonds and was going to destroy them upon
settlement.
121. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5201(b) (McKinney 1997); EM Ltd., 131 Fed. App'x 745.
122. EM Ltd., 131 Fed. App'x 745.
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VIM. The Role of Holdouts and Vulture Funds in Sovereign Debt
The creditors of a sovereign state may be divided into two large categories: official
creditors (multilateral organizations and countries that extend bilateral loans) and private
creditors. Private creditors, in turn, may be subdivided into institutional or sophisticated
creditors (investment funds, vulture funds, insurance companies, retirement and pension
funds, etc.) and retail or individual creditors. Under a sovereign debt restructuring, the
exchange offer extends to private creditors, sophisticated or not.
Holdouts include different kinds of creditors, but mainly consist of vulture funds and
retail creditors. Vulture funds have an eminent role in the international financial markets
as they purchase defaulted debt to satisfy the seller's liquidity requirements. Needless to
say, in order to justify the risk inherent in purchasing defaulted debt, the debt is purchased
at a large discount on its par value. The vulture fund gambles on recovering the deht's par
value through a legal action, and to thereby not only cover collection expenses but also to
obtain an additional gain (the difference between the discounted purchase price and its
face value), which is its source of income. It is worth emphasizing what has been noted by
an eminent specialist in the area, "[s]uing a sovereign is so damn hard-being a holdout is
hard, not smart."'123
Apart from being essential to financial markets, a vulture fund's business strategy is in
compliance with the rule of law. For example, a vulture fund that purchased defaulted
bonds of the Republic of Argentina in mid-2002-when the bonds were traded in the
secondary markets at 0.20% or less of their par value-and at the time of the exchange
selected the peso-denominated bonds at a price of thirty-five to thirty-seven cents, would
have obtained an annual yield of twenty-five percent. 24 This is the reason why many
Italian creditors, when forced with default, considered that they would not be able to
recover their investment, and traded their debt to vulture funds, which made a significant
gain.' 25
Vulture funds that do not take part in the exchange offer have become popular for their
judicial attempts to recover their credits, and this is why holdouts have been related to
vulture funds, although they are not necessarily the same thing. While a "holdout" is a
creditor that does not take part in a debt exchange, a "vulture fund" is a type of investment
fund that operates in the distressed debt market. The most widely known case of a
holdout that was also a vulture fund is the Elliot case.
IX. Concluding Remarks
It can be said that the pari passu clause mistakenly migrated from secured private lend-
ing to unsecured sovereign lending. Once rooted in unsecured sovereign lending instru-
ments, it faced certain provisions like the ones in Spain or the Philippines that allowed a
creditor to create a preference, positioning itself in a better place vis-d-vis other creditors,
and it became a "must have" provision in this type of debt instruments. Then, pari passu
123. Anna Gelpern & Mini Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REX'.
1627, 1693 (2007).
124. See Argentina's Debt Restructuring: A Victory by Default?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2005, at 62.
125. See generally Los italianosya vendieron 40% de los bonos en default (2005), available at http://www.infobae.
cofn/contenidos/165055-0-0-Los-italianos-ya-vendieron-40-los-bonos-default.
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clauses stayed in unsecured debt instruments due to the fear of the earmarking of revenues
or the risk of the sovereign preferring a group of creditors over another. These two fears
were tackled by an expanded negative pledge clause and the Libra and Allied Bank cases.
Therefore, if proper due diligence is conducted, there will be no need to have a pari passu
clause in the absence of exceptional circumstances like the ones in Spain or the Philip-
pines. Unfortunately, a misguided interpretation of the pari passu clause in the Elliot case
opened the door to litigation on incorrect grounds (payment interpretation or broad in-
terpretation of the pari passu clause). It was an aberration, but one that caused a furor.
The problem was that in Elliot there was no breach of the pari passu clause, just an incor-
rect understanding of its meaning. In the case of Argentina, the whole story could be
different because it can be correctly interpreted as a breach of the pari passu clause in its
ranking, or narrow form.126
126. Post-Argentina's potential litigation could be based on an actual breach of the paripassu clause. If this
is the case, a new wake ofpar passu litigation could be triggered. This article is Part I of the study. Part II
will be published in the LAW & BUSINESS REVIEW OF TI-iE AMERICAS, (forthcoming, Fall 2009). It is recom-
mended that the two parts should be read as a whole; they may each be accessed through Westlaw® and
LexisNexis®.
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